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A B S T R A C TClinical research is a specific phase of pharmaceutical industry’s
production process in which companies test candidate drugs on
patients to collect clinical evidence about safety and effectiveness.
Information is essential to obtain manufacturing authorization from
the national drug agency and, in this way, make profits on the market.
Considering this activity, however, the public stakeholder has to face a
conflict of interests. On the one side, there is society’s necessity to
make advances in medicine and, of course, to promote pharmaceu-
tical companies’ investments in this specific phase (new generation).
On the other side, there is the duty to protect patients involved in
these experimental treatments (old generation). To abide by this
moral duty, a protection system was developed through the years,
based on two legal institutions: informed consent and institutional
review board. How should an efficient protection system that wouldsee front matter Copyright & 2013, International
r Inc.
.1016/j.jval.2012.09.010
ppoliti@unipmn.it.
ondence to: Roberto Ippoliti, POLIS Institute, Univertake human experimentation into account be shaped? Would it be
possible for the national protection system of patients’ rights to affect
the choice of whether to develop a clinical trial in a given country or
not? Looking at Europe and considering a protection system that is
shaped around institutional review boards, this article is an empirical
work that tries to give answers to these open questions. It shows how
a protection system that can minimize the time necessary to start a
trial can positively affect pharmaceutical clinical research, that is, the
choice of pharmaceutical companies to start innovative medical
treatments in a given country.
Keywords: clinical research, efficiency, pharmaceuticals, protection
system of patients’ rights.
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Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction and Theoretical Background
According to international guidelines and declarations, such as
the International Conference on Harmonization of Good Clinical
Practice—which provides a unified standard for the European
Union (EU), Japan, and the United States, as well as those of
Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries, and the World Health
Organization—, the Helsinki Declaration [1], or the Nuremberg
Code [2], the protection of human rights for subjects in clinical
trials has to be assured. Each country receives these international
documents with its own national rules, even if with different
final implementations. However, a common rule that goes
beyond national identities is that each clinical trial has to be
authorized by an ethics committee before patients are involved.
This ethics committee, also called institutional review board
(IRB), is an independent committee designated to approve and
monitor clinical trials involving patients, with the aim of protect-
ing the rights and welfare of these subjects against the neces-
sities of the community. Obviously, the IRB is not a unique legal
institution behind the protection system of patients’ rights.
Another relevant institution is the informed consent, which is
the legal key through which the patients acquire information and
express their will. This institution deals with important biome-
dical ethics issues regarding therapeutic misconception, which isthe patients’ inability to understand that they are being used for
clinical research, receiving innovative medical treatment with
uncertain effectiveness.
The main patients’ right concerns their freedom of choice.
Indeed, the idea of research subjects’ rights grew at the end of
World War II when Nazi experiments on Jews and prisoners were
discovered. From that terrible experience, society felt that it had
the duty to prevent research involving people as subjects for
experiments not of their own free will. Currently, patients have to
be informed about the experiment (i.e., expected effectiveness, as
well as all expected/unexpected adverse events) and they cannot
be involved without their consensus. This is the main patients’
right in the domain of human experimentation that is assured by
the informed consent.
Taking the last 50 years into account, there are more exam-
ples of the necessity to protect patients, that is, more examples of
abuses from the strongest parties (i.e., pharmaceutical compa-
nies and/or physicians) versus the weakest (i.e., patients). As
mentioned above, the idea itself of ex-ante control to check the
scientific validity of the clinical protocol, as well as the freedom
of choice, is strictly linked to World War II and Nazi experiments.
There are other more recent instances, however, such as the
Vipeholm experiment (Sweden in the fifties) where, to learn more
about dental health, the effect of carbohydrates on dental cariesSociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
sity of Eastern Piedmont, 15121 Alessandria, Italy.
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brook experiments (the United States in the sixties) where
researchers gave live hepatitis viruses to children with mental
retardation to study the disease and ultimately develop a vaccine
for it [4].
Up to now, the main problem with a protection system shaped
around review boards concerns the conflicts of interest that
affect members of these IRBs, as Barnes et al. [5], Barnes [6],
and Goldner [7] state. Other interesting currents of thought
concern IRB’s decision-making methodology, that is, the effec-
tiveness of its practices. Indeed, according to Coleman [8], there
is a great deal of evidence that IRBs are ‘‘y often incapable of
reviewing complex research protocols effectivelyy’’ To increase
the current bibliography, this article tries to analyze the protec-
tion system of patients’ rights from another prospective: effi-
ciency, that is, the boards’ ability to minimize the required time
to review a clinical trial.
Society is made up of healthy and sick people and, obviously,
there is the necessity to guarantee both health and economic
development. Indeed, even if there are some risks, (i.e., expected
and unexpected adverse events), clinical trials can represent a
useful and free path to upgrade physicians’ knowledge and thus
the health care system they work for. At the same time, experi-
mental medical treatment is free. This means public saving and
therefore lower taxation, at least in those countries with a strong
public welfare system (e.g., European countries), as well as higher
access to innovative medical treatments (both in the United
States and in Europe). The proposal of free experimental drugs
where there is not a strong public welfare system (i.e., the United
States) has been studied deeply as undue influence, as well as the
proposal of paying research subjects [9–11]. Moreover, taking
medical centers into account, there is evidence of the positive
impact of clinical research on their reputation [12]. Finally,
another opportunity for healthy people could be satellite eco-
nomic activities.
This means that the public stakeholder would face a trade-off
that could turn into a hornet’s nest. Considering innovation in
medical knowledge, Calabresi [13] argues that it is necessary to
have ‘‘y an adequate balancing of present against future lives
and still sufficiently indirect and self-enforcing as to avoid clear
and purposive choices to kill individuals for the collective good
y’’ This is the trade-off that a policymaker has to face in building
an appropriate protection system. In other words, the public
stakeholder has to consider that increasing the degree of the
protection system of patients’ rights, that is, the rules adopted
to guarantee respect for patients, could lead to pharmaceutical
disinvestment in that country.
According to Ippoliti [14], in a global competitive market of
human experimentation, the protection system of patients’
rights could cause a shift in the supply of health care innovation
toward another country. The author suggests the existence of
a specific submarket within the market of medical care proposed
by Arrow [15], in which innovation is exchanged for information,
where the former is given by experimental medical treatments
(i.e., the difference, in terms of expected effectiveness, between
the experimental treatment and the current one), whereas the
latter is given by clinical evidence about experimental treatments
(i.e., evidence about the safety and effectiveness of candidate
drugs). According to this idea of market, the national protection
system of patients’ rights and its ex-ante authorization process
can affect the above-mentioned exchange, as well as the compe-
titiveness of countries. This competitiveness is based on transac-
tion costs, that is, the costs necessary to obtain ethical opinions
on an experimental protocol and to start the exchange. In other
words, the lower the time (or the required conditions) necessary
to perform the exchange of innovation for information, the
higher the number of experimental activities implemented bypharmaceutical companies and, therefore, the higher the
national competitiveness on the market of human experimenta-
tion. Obviously, focusing on the time necessary to start a clinical
trial, this work only considers IRBs’ activity and what can affect
their efficiency. Note that a competitive system does not imply
the effectiveness of this system in the protection of patients’
rights. Indeed, a long process of revision made by the IRB could
be more effective in the protection of patients’ rights, even if it
is less competitive in the market of human experimentation.
This work focuses only on the efficiency of the protection system
and how it could affect countries’ competitiveness.
This is the specific background in which the proposed analysis
is shaped. Companies develop new molecules inside their labora-
tories and then they proceed with the patent process. The life of
a patent is 20 years, and before authorization to manufacture is
obtained, evidence concerning this new product is necessary.
Obviously, the shorter the testing phase, the higher the expected
profit. In other words, the efficiency of a protection system could
affect the time required to test the innovative drug and thus
increase the future expected profit.
Current bibliography can support the appropriateness of the
proposed approach, considering both the issue is related to the
regulation and the one is linked to the outsourcing of medical
research.
Adobor [16] suggests how ‘‘y pharmaceutical companies
benefit from cost-savings and reduced time in getting their drugs
to markety’’ as well as ‘‘y global pharmaceutical giants such as
Novartis, Astra Zeneca, Eli Lily, and Pfizer continue to outsource
medical research globally y’’ Among several keys, the author
recognizes regulation as a potential explanatory variable of
pharmaceutical companies’ localization of the testing phase,
especially considering the need for speed in drug development.
Indeed, as suggested by Bodenheimer [17], each day’s delay in
gaining Food and Drug Administration approval of a drug, the
manufacturer loses, on average, $1.3 million in potential revenue.
Moreover, studying the Food and Drug Administration, Gauch [18]
also suggests that ‘‘y approval delays also cost the drug sponsor
because they are not able to start receiving a return on their
sizable investment in developing a drug ...’’ as well as
‘‘y statistics had shown that drugs were being approved sooner
in other countries and that made the FDA appeared overly
cautious y’’ Obviously, as has been aforementioned, the main
consequence of this issue is the outsourcing of clinical trials
where there are better conditions, that is, where the regulation
might be more competitive and/or more relaxed (i.e., emerging
markets). According to Adobor [16], multinational corporations
such as Pfizer, Eli Lily, GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi Aventis, and
Roche have started clinical studies abroad, with India the pre-
ferred destination. Other leading emerging destinations include
Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa [19], with
China angling for a piece of the outsourcing pie [20]. Evidence of
relaxed regulation has been collected in these emerging markets:
clinical researchers have tested illegal drugs and conducted
studies without IRB approval [21], as well as there is no IRB at
all and when present, there may be conflict of interest between
members of the IRB and medical researchers/pharmaceutical
companies [22].
Considering regulation, the main related concept in the
proposed background is the transaction costs, which has been
introduced by Coase [23] studying market organization and firms.
The assumption of positive transaction costs, instead of zero
costs, has begun to take hold only after two decades, as well
suggested by Coase himself [24]. This turning point is due to two
contributions [25,26] in which authors underline the necessity
to study the real world of positive transaction costs and the
failure of many current theories. In the following years, the idea
of positive transaction costs was deeply analyzed, especially in
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priately, or inappropriately, organized to minimize these positive
transaction costs. This is the specific framework around which the
proposed analysis is shaped. Indeed, as suggested by Williamson
[27] in his Nobel Prize lecture, ‘‘y governance is the overarching
concept and transaction cost economics is the means by which to
breathe operational content into governance and organizationy’’
This is mainly an empirical work whose aim is the study of
countries’ competition in the review process. Data are essential
to obtain evidence and, for this reason, this work focuses
exclusively on the European market of human experimentation
and its protection system. Analyzing the economic efficiency of
countries’ clinical review processes and their link to the countries
competitiveness on the proposed market of human experimen-
tation, the article tries to face some related issues. How should a
protection system of patients’ rights be shaped to be competitive
on the market of human experimentation? Moreover, what
factors could affect the choice of pharmaceutical companies to
develop a trial in one of these countries and not another?
Focusing on the efficiency domain, these are the specific research
questions that this article will try to answer through empirical
analysis.
In the first section, Europe is considered and data and main
descriptive statistics are presented, whereas in the second sec-
tion, empirical analysis is proposed to support the main idea of
competitiveness on rules, as well as which criteria could affect that
competitiveness.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Considering a panel between 2004 and 2007, two econometric
models are performed to study the relationship between phar-
maceutical clinical research and efficiency of the protection
system of patients’ rights in Europe. The considered panel
(4 years) was chosen because data on the national protection
system of patients’ rights, as well as some specific socioeconomic
conditions, are available.
In this work, Europe is considered as a group made up of 29
European countries, that is, 27 countries of the European Union
(except Luxembourg and Romania) plus Croatia, Iceland, Norway,
and Switzerland. These countries comprise the sample of obser-
vations used in the statistical analysis. The proposed data set
(i.e., sample of observations and variables) has been already used
in an empirical analysis of the European market of human
experimentation [28]. The innovative variable is a representative
index of national protection system of patients’ rights.
As mentioned before, the choice of the sample considered was
affected not only by data availability but also by the necessity to
respect the condition of minimum technology. In other words,
without specific data, it could conceivably be true that in the
sample considered all European countries have medical centers
with those technologies necessary to do a trial, for example,
medical laboratories. At the same time, in the case of maximum
technology, this could be easily imported. For example, if some
genetic or biomolecular examinations are necessary, blood sam-
ples could be easily localized to the pharmaceutical companies’
laboratories (i.e., where the technology is).
The dependent variable used is clinical studies that started in
Europe between 2004 and 2007, and were collected by the U.S.
National Institute of Health [29]. Only studies of phases II and III
funded by industries were considered. Studies funded by uni-
versities and public agencies were not considered because the
aim of this article was to study the economic interests of
pharmaceutical industries and how this could affect national
clinical research with respect to the national protection system.
Moreover, studies of phases I and IV were not considered,
because the first involves healthy people whereas the second,regardless of the fact that it involves patients, is affected by
marketing processes. The analysis was implemented with two
different approaches: the total number of clinical trials set up
and with respect to the number of locations involved for each
country in those trials. The former considers each national
clinical study as a medical opportunity, whereas the latter could
be considered as an economic proxy of the pharmaceutical
investment in that country. Moreover, through an appropriate
index, a combination of both variables is proposed.
Taking n countries into account (a subgroup of the potential G
candidate countries), each ith country’s research index is equal to
the sum of clinical trials in the considered country (Kd, where d ¼
1, y, m, and m represents the total number of studies imple-
mented in the analyzed sample), weighted to the relative fre-
quency of country locations (L):
RESEARCHINDEXi¼
Xm
d¼1
Kid
Pm
d¼1 Li=
PG
g¼1 Lg
 
dPm
d¼1
Pn
i¼1 Li=
PG
g¼1 Lg
 
d
2
64
3
75 ð1Þ
where K¼ 0; 1f g, with 1 if activated.
To understand the difference between these dependent vari-
ables more clearly, let us assume that a clinical trial started in
four European countries. On the one hand, it represents an
innovative medical opportunity for each country; that is, the
value of that trial is equal to 1 for each country. On the other
hand, according to the proposed index and assuming that the
first country has half the locations whereas the other three have
an equal number of the remaining locations, the same trial will
have a weight of 0:5for the first country and a weight of 0:16 for
the other three countries.
From these considerations, this index can represent the
pharmaceutical investments in Europe and it should be the target
of each policymaker. In other words, each public stakeholder
interested in pharmaceutical research in terms of both quantity
(locations) and quality (number of clinical trials) should consider
this kind of index in his or her strategy.
Among independent variables there are the adoption of the
euro and EU, population, national wealth, physicians, protection
system of patients’ rights, and people’s knowledge. Even if there
are only seven explanatory variables, they are significant for the
proposed analysis. In other words, through these variables the
analysis is able to consider both economic factors (i.e., the euro
and national wealth) and regulation factors (i.e., the protection
system), as well as resources of the testing phase (i.e., physicians,
population, and the knowledge of these potential research sub-
jects), in the pharmaceutical choice to develop a trial among
candidate countries. Moreover, the potential correlation among
variables prevents the introduction of some other interesting
explanatory variables such as, for example, some national char-
acteristic of the health care system (e.g., number of beds).
Considering Europe and taking the expected cost of clinical
evidence into account, a candidate variable could be the euro,
considered as a strong currency. Indeed, the period between 2004
and 2007 was characterized by a strong appreciation in the value
of the euro versus the main foreign currencies, that is, Swiss
franc, Japanese yen, and US dollar, as well as other European
currencies [30]. Obviously, currency appreciation is a direct cause
of export reduction and foreign investment. Considering our
market of human experimentation, the competitiveness of coun-
tries, which could be reasonably based on the cost of clinical
evidence (i.e., physicians’ fee and/or laboratories’ exams), should
be negatively affected by that strong currency. In other words,
there will be expectations that a strong currency will negatively
affect the localization of pharmaceutical companies’ testing
phase among European countries. In the empirical analysis, a
dummy variable is adopted: equal to 1 if the currency adopted is
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considered. Indeed, the wealth index is a proxy of the countries’
competitiveness on the market of human experimentation (i.e.,
clinical evidence’s cost). In particular, the index is expressed in
relation to the n European countries’ average, equal to 100. The
formula is as follows:
WEALTHINDEXti¼
WtiPn
i¼1W
t
i=n
" #
ð2Þ
where W is the gross domestic product based on purchasing-
power-parity per capita of the ith country in year t, with n ¼ 33. The
proposed index measures how fast people’s wealth increases in
each country in comparison to the average of the considered
countries. Making several assumptions on the localization of
production processes, it also measures national competitiveness
on the European market of labor. This is the main idea suggested
by Ippoliti [28]: considering the testing phase as any other produc-
tion process that can be localized where the labor cost (physicians’
fee) is more competitive; that is, where the index is positive.
Data about countries’ population and wealth index were
extracted from the database of the International Monetary Fund
[31], whereas data about gross enrollment ratio were collected
from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization database.
Gross enrollment ratio is linked to the difficulties faced by
medical researchers in the enrollment process (i.e., awareness of
expected and unexpected adverse events). Indeed, according to
Kahneman and Tversky [32], as well as Sankar [33], the same
issue regarding human experimentation can have a different
impact on people’s minds. In other words, the choice could be
affected by what the background of these patients is, as well as
the context in which the proposal was made. Starting from their
observations, what could the role of knowledge be in the enroll-
ment process of potential research subjects? Is the hypothesis
that a higher knowledge can affect the enrollment process of
research subjects positively admissible? Alternatively, can a
higher knowledge affect the research process negatively because
there is a higher awareness of potential unexpected risks? This is
something that should be considered by pharmaceutical compa-
nies in the choice of where to develop a trial, and so this article
has taken this into account. The data considered come from the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
database and concerns all levels [34].
Population has a double function. On the one hand, this
variable is necessary to normalize the observations and compare
countries of different sizes, whereas, on the other hand, the
number of potential patients can affect the probability to enroll
exactly, according to the inclusion criteria of the experimental
protocol, that specific subject.
Physicians are involved in this activity as medical researchers
and patients as research subjects. Obviously, this experimental
activity is performed within medical centers. To capture the
impact of the health care system on companies’ choice, two
proxies are considered: the number of physicians and the
number of hospital beds. The data considered come from the
World Health Organization database, European office, and con-
cerns the number per 100,000 inhabitants. Finally, there is the
regulation issue. Taking the protection system into consideration,
an index is developed considering two factors: the degree to
which pharmaceutical companies choose who will review their
trial and the efficiency of this system. The freedom to choose
who will review the trial is represented by the network of IRBs
within a country. It could be central (only one IRB), regional (more
than one governing a specific territory competence), or local
(close to the medical center involved in the trial). If the number
of IRBs increases, the degree to which companies can choose willincrease. According to this assumption, an increasing value is
given, that is, 1 to the central system, 2 to the regional one, and 3
to the local one. The rule applied is the following: if there is only
one central authority that is responsible for the ethical review of
clinical trials, the system is classified as central. If the answer is
negative and there are more IRBs, the question is a different one:
Is the IRBs’ competence territorial? If the answer is now positive,
the system is regional; otherwise, it is local. At the same time
within each system other factors are combined to consider the
individual efficiency of these IRBs, representative of their ability
to authorize a trial in the shortest possible time.
In detail, the IRB index is so built:
IRBINDEXi¼yiþ
Xn
x¼1
xi ð3Þ
where yi 2 1,2,3f g, according to the IRB territorial competence of
the ith country (central ¼ 1, regional ¼ 2, local ¼ 3), whereas,
considering a review of an international clinical trial with a single
opinion, xi are efficiency factors:
x1 ¼ Is there an economic fee charged by ethics committees
for their review? (positive effect)
x2 ¼ Considering the deadline of the EU directive, does the
national law try to reduce ethics committees’ time to review
trials? (positive effect)
x3 ¼ Is there a competitiveness mechanism able to downgrade
ethics committees? (positive effect)
x4 ¼ Taking the regional and local systems into account,
regardless of the single opinion, is the approval of all ethics
committees involved necessary? (negative effect)
x5 ¼ Regardless of the boards’ competence, is it possible for a
pharmaceutical company to choose the ethics committee it
prefers? (positive effect)
x6 ¼ Can pharmaceutical company submit the request?
(positive effect)
where all effects, both positive and negative, are variations equal
to 0.5. Information about national systems is taken from the
report of the European Forum for Good Clinical Practice on The
Procedure for the Ethical Review of Protocols for Clinical Research
Projects in Europe [35]. According to Smith [36] and Madhu [37],
this report presents invaluable information about the ethical
review process across Europe through a systematic analysis of
national interpretation (i.e., implementation into national legis-
lation) of EU Directive 2001/20/EC [38].
As suggested above, time means profit for pharmaceutical
companies. Efficiency factors in the IRB index are connected to
the system’s competitiveness in the time required to obtain an
ethical authorization. Let us examine two interesting cases: Belgium
and Italy. Systems are local; that is, the IRBs are close to the medical
center where the trial will be developed, and they charge fees. Per
capita number of IRBs could give an idea of this local competence:
one IRB per 304,767 inhabitants in Belgium and 225,830 in Italy. Note
how different this is from France (regional system) with its 1,590,580
inhabitants. The rules of the Italian system regulate the time to
obtain an ethical review as 60 days, whereas in Belgium it is 28 days.
Moreover, regardless of the single opinion, the Italian rule considers
the ethical review from all IRBs involved necessary, whereas in
Belgium there is a periodical revision of IRBs’ activities with a
related mechanism of downgrading.
Taking the above-mentioned parameters into consideration,
the Belgian system should be more competitive than the Italian
one because it is more efficient. The less time required to obtain a
review, the higher the incentive to work with that nation rather
than another one. These should be the keys through which a
policymaker could improve the national competitiveness on the
global market of human experimentation, making his or her
country more attractive on the regulations side.
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables.
Variable Observations Mean  SD Minimum Maximum
Research index 130 0.9519596  3.671451 12.70107 4.50951
Clinical studies 130 3.799317  1.532096 0 5.983936
Medical centers 130 4.958651  2.005728 0 8.233237
Euro 132 0.3712121  0.4849696 0 1
European Union 132 0.7727273  0.4206667 0 1
Population 132 4.254583  1.49158 1.078 6.715
Physicians 108 324.609  70.44207 152.73 534.59
Hospital beds 129 560.3689  166.1618 227.48 857.93
Wealth index 132 4.488167  4994853 3.341 5.624
IRB index 116 2.827586  1.065473 1 5
Gross enrollment ratio (all levels) 125 88.67985  8.700986 69.52114 102.7634
IRB, institutional review board.
* If a log-transformation has been applied.
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Both for the research index, the clinical studies, and medical centers and
for the population and wealth index, a log-transformation has been
applied to have a better normal distribution. Moreover, considering
independent variables, the pairwise correlation is tested with
acceptable results. Among statistically significant correlations (i.e.,
P ¼ 0.0000), the highest levels are the relation between the wealth
index and the gross enrollment ratio (0.5261) and between the euro and
the wealth index (0.4970). The construction of this pairwise correla-
tion matrix will yield indications as to the likelihood that any given
couplet of right-hand-side variables is multicollinear.
In the next sections, models that have been worked out and
results that have been obtained will be presented.Empirical Analysis
The data set was analyzed with STATA. The first analysis (i.e.,
Table 2) presents a multiple regression model considering theTable 2 – Relation between pharmaceutical clinical research an
model, random effects, and bootstrap option
Variables Research index
Euro 2.003 (0.464)
European Union 0.0584 (0.578)
Population 2.141 (0.0995)
Wealth index 1.056 (1.000)
Physicians 0.00692† (0.00336)
GER (all levels) 0.109 (0.0346)
IRB index 0.601 (0.107)
Constant 27.58 (3.657)
F statistic (P4 w2)
Wald w2 (7) 1004.09
Probability 4 w2 0.0000
R2
Within 0.2365
Between 0.8761
Overall 0.8376
Number of observations 88
Number of countries 27
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
GER, gross enrollment ratio; IRB, institutional review board.
* P o 0.01.
† Po 0.05.
z Po 0.1.number of physicians, whereas the second analysis does so (i.e.,
Table 3) considering hospital beds. The potential correlation
among variables prevents the contemporaneous introduction of
these two explanatory variables and, for this reason, two models
are proposed. In both cases, the models are cross-sectional time
series with random-effects option. Moreover, the bootstrap
option is applied with 200 replacements. Obviously, according
to the proposed approach, appropriate tests to validate relative
assumptions about the variables are performed, along with the
residuals of each analysis.
All regressions of Table 2 are pretty good in terms of the
percentage of variance of the response variable explained by
the explanatory variables, given by the square of the multiple
correlation coefficients; along with this the hypothesis that all
the regression coefficients in the fitted model are 0 is rejected
(F test). As has been aforementioned, the normal probability plot
of standardized residuals has been verified with acceptable
results.d national features, Europe 2004–2007, multiple regression
Clinical studies Medical centers
0.786 (0.205) 1.069 (0.251)
0.0130 (0.284) 0.0562 (0.336)
0.894 (0.0446) 1.245 (0.0562)
0.174 (0.390) 0.0337 (0.435)
0.00320z (0.00172) 0.00349z (0.00201)
0.0488 (0.0164) 0.0725 (0.0191)
0.248 (0.0511) 0.259 (0.0621)
6.568 (1.288) 8.118 (1.807)
874.59 987.24
0.0000 0.0000
0.1908 0.2155
0.8982 0.9189
0.8341 0.8737
88 88
27 27
Table 3 – Relation between pharmaceutical clinical research and national features, Europe 2004–2007, multiple regression
model, random effects, and bootstrap option.
Variables Research index Clinical studies Medical centers
Euro 0.952 (0.506) 0.334 (0.222) 0.585† (0.235)
European Union 0.272 (0.531) 0.0170 (0.308) 0.0410 (0.358)
Population 2.006z (0.104) 0.820z (0.0502) 1.171z (0.0573)
Wealth index 0.879 (0.777) 0.139 (0.350) 0.0307 (0.408)
Hospital beds 0.00158 (0.00118) 9.66  105 (0.000617) 0.000346 (0.000618)
GER (all levels) 0.0986z (0.0344) 0.0445z (0.0167) 0.0678z (0.0197)
IRB index 0.558z (0.105) 0.266z (0.0550) 0.283z (0.0585)
Constant 23.89z (3.272) 4.843z (1.491) 6.640z (1.648)
F statistic (P4 w2)
Wald w2 (7) 811.16 612.17 952.03
Probability 4 w2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2
Within 0.0842 0.0872 0.1322
Between 0.9013 0.8979 0.9131
Overall 0.8440 0.8115 0.8527
Number of observations 105 105 105
Number of countries 28 28 28
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.
GER, gross enrollment ratio; IRB, institutional review board.
* P o 0.1.
† Po 0.05.
z Po 0.01.
VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 4 8 – 1 5 4 153The coefficient of the euro variable suggests that the testing
phase works like any other productive process because in the
countries with that strong currency there is a reduction of that
investment. Moreover, the degree of this impact on the medical
centers (3) is really interesting because it is higher than the
clinical studies (2). This difference could be explained by the
number of locations taken into account, that is, by the number of
physicians involved in that activity as well as the number of
subjects enrolled.
Obviously, the population is statistically significant and its
coefficient is really high. Indeed, this result confirms that there
are more experimental trials where there are more potential
patients to be treated, especially if the number of locations is
considered. Also, the gross enrollment ratio is positive and
statistically significant. An interpretation of this result can be
linked to the expectations of educated people with regard to the
latest product of scientific knowledge. In other words, people
with high knowledge can believe and respond positively to the
challenge of pharmaceutical industry versus the current knowl-
edge for that specific disease.
In any case, the most interesting proxy is the IRB index with
positive and statistically significant coefficients in all regressions.
This means that a positive correlation between an efficient
system and pharmaceutical investments in experimental treat-
ment exists and could be the way through which a policymaker
can not only improve national clinical research but also, at the
same time, increase knowledge and economic opportunities for
healthy people, as well as medical opportunities for sick ones
within the health care system.
Table 3 proposes the same analysis, but considering the
number of hospital beds. As mentioned above, the choice of
two different analyses is affected by a strong correlation between
the number of physicians and the number of hospital beds.
However, thanks to different data availability, the number of
useful observations increases (28 countries and 105 observations
vs. 27 countries and 88 observations).Even if the model changes, the main hypothesis of a correla-
tion between pharmaceutical clinical research and the efficiency
of the protection system works again. Taking the proposed IRB
index into account, this result can confirm only the goodness of
the proposed analysis. Moreover, considering the health care
system, the reader can note that only the number of physicians
positively affect the choice of pharmaceutical companies. This
result is coherent with the nature of pharmaceutical clinical
research, in which medical researchers and research subjects are
the main actors.
The next section proposes some final considerations, taking
the public stakeholder’s point of view into consideration.Conclusions
Patients’ rights are guaranteed by a system of IRBs and their
preventive control of all trials. This article has shown one
potential way in which a policymaker could improve national
competitiveness on the global market of clinical research. Indeed,
the analysis supports the idea that if an IRB can minimize the
required time to authorize a trial, the pharmaceutical industry’s
investment (in the testing phase) will increase. To put it in
normative terms, a national protection system should be shaped
around a competitive approach such as the one proposed, with
each IRB pushed to compete on the basis of time factors to attract
pharmaceutical companies. Features of this ideal system might
be related to a high number of competitive IRBs with an appro-
priate mechanism of economic incentive, as well as a mechanism
able to downgrade these ethics committees if they are not
efficient and/or unproductive. At the same time, the involvement
of pharmaceutical companies in the bureaucratic process could
sound appropriate because they can (reasonably) minimize the
time to start a review. Finally, a system should avoid the
duplication of review processes; that is, the single opinion should
be applied in a strict and rigorous way.
VA L U E I N H E A LT H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 4 8 – 1 5 4154Although this work is shaped around a sample of European
countries, these results can be extended to emerging markets. In
other words, the same efficiency arguments can explain why one
country may be chosen over the other even in emerging markets.
The main weakness of this work is related to the considered
sample and to the statistical assumption about extraction from a
hypothetical population of companies (National Institutes of
Health data set), which is affected by data availability. Studies
on a more complete data set, if it becomes available, will be an
opportunity to strengthen the achieved results and to increase
the current knowledge. A further weakness is related to potential
multicollinearity. Even if the values obtained from the pairwise
correlation are not excessively high (i.e., 0.5261), the results of the
proposed analysis could be improved, reducing these values. Data
availability will permit a deeper analysis of what has been
proposed, confirming the goodness of this work. Indeed, increas-
ing the sample of observations (e.g., considering Western coun-
tries and emerging markets) might be a great opportunity both to
increase the predictability of this work and to reduce potential
errors due to multicollinearity.
A potential development could be related to the IRB index and
the considered questions. Future work will try to develop the
current analysis, increasing the predictability of the proposed
index, collecting other data, and implementing a stronger panel
data analysis. Another interesting work could concern the weight
of each factor within the IRB index to support a more significant
and competitive protection system on the global market of
human experimentation. At the same time, the empirical analy-
sis could be aimed at achieving both effectiveness and efficiency
of the protection system and their compatibility.
Finally, a further development of this work might be related to
the new European regulation on clinical trials. Indeed, on July 17,
2012, the Commission has adopted a ’’Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on clinical trials on
medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/
20/EC.’’ Behind this proposal there is clearly the necessity to
increase European competitiveness through regulation, as well
suggested by the document. This could be an excellent opportu-
nity to validate the proposed theory about regulation and trans-
action cost theory in an appropriate empirical legal study, as soon
as the new rules will be implemented.Acknowledgments
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